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Abstract: Chinese firms operating in Africa are often accused of violating international labour 
standards and not adhering with national labour laws. Considering China’s tendency to maintain 
control over development projects throughout the entire implementation phase, using Chinese 
contractors for work performed in the recipient countries, the present paper investigates whether 
China impacts African labour practices in their capacity as a donor. Specifically, we use a new data 
material allowing for systematic quantitative analysis of Chinese development finance to investigate 
whether Chinese development projects affect trade union involvement. Matching geo-referenced 
data on the subnational allocation of Chinese development projects to Africa over the 2000-2012 
period with 41,902 survey respondents across 18 African countries, our estimation strategy relies on 
comparing the trade union involvement of individuals who live near a site where a Chinese project is 
being implemented at the time of the interview to those of individuals living near a site where a 
Chinese project will appear in the future, but where implementation had yet to be initiated at the 
time of the survey. The results consistently indicate that Chinese development projects – unlike the 
projects of other major donors – discourage trade union involvement in the local area.  
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1 Introduction 
 
In 2005 an explosion at a Chinese-owned factory in Chambishi, Zambia, killed 46 workers. 
The following year, riots over work conditions culminated in the shooting – allegedly by a 
Chinese manager – of at least five miners in the same town (Human Rights Watch, 2011). 
While clearly an extreme case, it illustrates that labour relations between Chinese 
management and African workers have been, to say the least, strained. Anecdotal evidence 
points to serious violations of international labour standards at Chinese investment sites in 
Africa (e.g. Jauch and Sakaria, 2009; Human Rights Watch, 2011; and Akorsu and Cooke, 
2011), and a recent study suggests a ‘Shanghai Effect’, whereby African countries trading 
with China begin to reflect comparatively low Chinese labour protection standards (Adolph et 
al., 2017). This paper investigates a potential alternative channel through which China may 
impact African labour practices, namely in their capacity as a major donor. 
 The global economic landscape has changed dramatically since the turn of the 
millennium: low and middle income countries have been driving global economic growth, 
new sources of development finance have emerged and the development cooperation arena 
has seen continued diversification of actors, instruments and delivery mechanisms (Kharas 
and Rogerson, 2012; Mawdsley et al, 2014). In this process, the role of traditional official 
development assistance (ODA) in development cooperation is becoming less dominant. 
According to a recent estimate, non-ODA flows – including e.g. official export credits, FDI, 
private grants, private remittances and other private flows at market terms – accounted for 
over 80% of external resources received by developing countries (OECD, 2014). In parallel, 
the dominance of aid from the OECD-DAC countries is declining, with recent years seeing  a 
sharp increase in development finance from non-Western donors, with China at the forefront 
(see e.g. Strange et al., 2015; Dreher et al., 2011; Dreher et al., 2015). The changing 
circumstances call for a renewed focus on the implications and challenges of development 
cooperation in general, and for an understanding of the implications of the rise of new actors 
and financial flows in particular. With commercial and concessional flows being increasingly 
intertwined, there is a need for a broader view when analyzing the impacts of aid, 
incorporating questions traditionally not studied within the aid framework.  
 The present paper examines the impact of Chinese development projects on labour union 
involvement in African recipient countries. China is well-known for being heavily involved 
throughout the implementation phase of development projects, mixing commercial interests 
with concessional flows e.g. by conditioning their funds on the use of Chinese contractors and 
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staff for work performed in the recipient countries (see e.g. Tull, 2006; Bräutigam, 2009; Tan-
Mullins et al., 2010). Given this nature of Chinese development finance, criticisms over its 
donor practices go beyond issues of aid allocation and aid effectiveness.
1
 In particular, 
concerns are often raised with regard to labour rights at Chinese production sites in Africa, 
with reports of labour abuses, poor health and safety standards, and anti-union activities (see 
e.g. Jauch and Sakaria, 2009, on Namibia; Human Rights Watch, 2011, on Zambia; and 
Akorsu and Cooke, 2011, on Ghana). However, as pointed out by Strange et al. (2013), there 
is a lack of statistical evidence to corroborate these allegations on a wider scale. 
 Until very recently, there has indeed been little systematic empirical evidence on the 
effects of, and principles guiding, Chinese development assistance in general. Unlike the 
OECD-DAC donors, the Chinese government does not release detailed, project-level financial 
information about its foreign aid activities (Strange et al., 2013). This lack of transparency has 
made evaluation of Chinese aid notoriously difficult, and as a result, China’s aid to Africa is 
the subject of much speculation.  
 We use a new comprehensive data material (Strange et al., 2015) allowing for systematic 
quantitative analysis of Chinese development finance to investigate whether Chinese 
development projects affect trade union involvement in Africa. We ask whether the Chinese 
choose to establish their projects in areas with weaker trade unions, and whether they, through 
their presence, affect the degree of trade union involvement. The results are compared with 
those for other major donors. 
 To this end, we geographically match geo-referenced data on the subnational allocation 
of Chinese development projects to Africa over the 2000-2012 period with 41,902 
respondents from rounds 2 and 3 of the Afrobarometer survey across 18 African countries. 
We compare the trade union involvement of individuals who live near a site where a Chinese 
project is being implemented at the time of the interview to those of individuals living near a 
site where a Chinese project will appear in the future, but where implementation had yet to be 
initiated once the Afrobarometer covered that particular area. This will control for 
unobservable time-invariant characteristics that may influence the selection of project sites.  
                                                          
1
 While some praise China for being responsive to recipient needs and having the ability to get things done fast 
without placing an extensive administrative burden on the bureaucracies in partner countries, critics claim that 
they use their development finance to create alliances with (corrupt and undemocratic) leaders of developing 
countries in order to secure commercial advantages for their domestic firms and to gain access to their natural 
resource endowments (see the discussion in e.g. Tull, 2006; Kaplinsky et al., 2007; Naím, 2007; Penhelt, 2007; 
Bräutigam, 2009; Marantidou and Glosserman, 2015; Dreher et al., 2016). 
4 
 
 The results consistently indicate that Chinese development projects discourage trade 
union involvement in the surrounding areas. These results do not translate to other forms of 
participation not directly connected to the workplace, seemingly indicating that the lower 
unionization rates observed near ongoing as compared to future Chinese project sites stem 
from direct anti-union policies rather than from more general institutional change. China 
clearly diverges from other donors in this respect. In particular, in line with World Bank 
efforts to promote civil society development and community participation, World Bank 
projects are found to stimulate rather than to discourage union involvement. 
 Investigating the effect of Chinese development projects on labour union involvement – a 
central aspect of labour relations as well as key form of civic engagement – our paper relates 
to several strands of literature. First, it clearly has bearing on the large literature exploring the 
impact of globalization on countries’ regulatory standards in terms of e.g. labour protection. 
Recent contributions to this literature tend to emphasize the importance of with whom 
international relationships are established, as opposed to the level of international 
interconnectedness. Rather than trade resulting in regulatory races to the bottom, several 
studies propose a ‘California effect’ (Vogel, 1995) whereby the main export destinations – 
traditionally rich Western countries – project their high regulatory standards on less 
developed export partners (see e.g. Prakash and Potoski, 2006; Greenhill et al., 2009; and 
Cao, Greenhill, & Prakash, 2013). With the rise of China as a major player in Africa, 
however, this perspective may need rethinking. As noted, a recent study (Adolph et al., 2017) 
suggests a less optimistic ‘Shanghai Effect’, whereby African countries trading with China 
begin to reflect comparatively low Chinese labour protection standards.  
 Second, seeing that labour union involvement is a form of civic engagement, which 
Western donors have traditionally sought to encourage in partner countries, the paper relates 
to the literature on the impact of foreign aid on political institutions and governance (see e.g. 
Svensson, 2000; Alesina and Weder, 2002; Bräutigam and Knack, 2004; Djankov et al., 2008; 
Jones and Tarp, 2016). This strand of literature is wide in scope,
2
 discussing both intended 
and unintended consequences of aid, and has, just as the aid effectiveness literature more 
broadly, had difficulties reaching a consensus. A reason for the inconclusive results is likely 
that the terms ‘institutions’ and ‘governance’ are used to refer to a broad range of factors,3 
coupled with the tendency to use cross-national data. Comparing across countries it is of 
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 For a recent overview, see Bourguignon and Gunning (2016). 
3
 Consider e.g. democracy, rule of law, corruption, executive constraints, judicial independence and political 
terror (see the discussion in Jones and Tarp, 2016). 
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course difficult to separate the impact of aid from the effects of problems that are common in 
aid receiving countries (see the discussion in Bräutigam and Knack, 2004). Considering the 
multitude of factors that could affect country level institutions over time, a better option is 
arguably to focus on the local effects of sub-national variation in aid disbursements. While aid 
may have important effects in targeted areas, these effects may not be sufficiently large (or 
may be obscured by omitted variable bias) to be measurable at the country level (see the 
reasoning on aid and regional growth in Dreher and Lohmann, 2015). Arguably, the aid vs. 
institutions literature would benefit from a more disaggregated approach, both in scope and in 
space. Focusing on local effects on a specific form of civic engagement, we will not attempt 
to draw any broad conclusions on the effects of aid on political institutions, but will on the 
other hand be able to interpret donor heterogeneity in the effects of aid on local citizen 
participation.  
 This brings us to the third strand of literature to which the present paper contributes, 
namely the recently increasing number of studies using subnational geocoded aid data to 
examine the determinants and impacts of the allocation of foreign aid within countries.
4
 
Focusing on the subnational allocation of Chinese aid for a large number of recipient 
countries, within this category our paper is closest to that of Dreher et al. (2016), who find 
that Chinese aid is disproportionately allocated to the birth regions of African leaders, and to 
that of Isaksson and Kotsadam (2016), who find that Chinese aid projects fuel local corruption 
in recipient countries.  
 To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper systematically investigating the 
impact of Chinese development projects on trade union involvement in a wide selection of 
African recipient countries. As such, the paper contributes to the above strands of literature as 
well as to an emerging quantitative literature on the effects and determinants of China’s aid 
allocation (Dreher and Fuchs, 2015; Dreher et al., 2015; Dreher et al., 2016; Isaksson and 
Kotsadam, 2016). Considering China’s increased presence in Africa and the mounting 
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 See e.g. Findley et al. (2011) on aid and conflict; Francken et al. (2012) on relief aid allocation in Madagascar; 
Nunnenkamp et al. (2012) on the distribution of World Bank aid in India; Powell and Findley (2012) on donor 
coordination; Dionne et al. (2013) on aid allocation in Malawi; Briggs (2014) and Jablonski (2014), both on 
political capture of aid in Kenya; Öhler and Nunnenkamp (2014) on factors determining the allocation of World 
Bank and African Development Bank aid; Briggs (2015) on the allocation of aid to richer subnational regions; 
Dreher and  Lohmann (2015) on aid and growth at the regional level; Kelly et al. (2016), on the relationship  
between Chinese aid and perceptions of corruption in Tanzania; and Berlin et al. (2017) on the effects of aid on 
gender outcomes in Malawi and Uganda. 
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criticism concerning Chinese aid practices, empirical evidence on the effects of their 
involvement is central.  
 
 2 Related literature 
 
 2.1 Globalization and the diffusion of regulatory standards 
 
Earlier globalization studies often focused on the impact of the level of international 
interconnectedness (in terms of e.g. trade or FDI) on regulatory standards, with inconclusive 
results. Globalization sceptics argued that trade gives rise to a race to the bottom in terms of 
regulatory standards, the argument with respect to labour rights being that since developing 
countries can create a comparative advantage by keeping labour costs low, both governments 
and exporting firms have incentives to suppress labour rights. Globalization optimists, on the 
other hand, suggested that increased levels of trade will lead to gains in regulatory standards, 
since trade openness is associated with economic growth and development, and economic 
development in turn can spur political reform (see e.g. Richards et al., 2001; Mosley and Uno, 
2007; and the discussion in Greenhill et al., 2009),  
 More recent studies in this field argue that the important factor is not how much a country 
trades, but with whom (see e.g. Greenhill et al., 2009). They highlight that trade relationships 
are not homogenous, and that a given exporter may well face conflicting pressures from 
different importing countries with different regulatory standards. Disaggregating overall 
exports, they find that export-led regulatory diffusion tends to reflect the standards of the 
destinations to which countries’ goods are exported. Since the largest export destinations have 
traditionally been rich countries with relatively high regulatory standards, these studies tend to 
have an optimistic view on trade-based diffusion of regulatory standards, suggesting that 
rather than trade resulting in regulatory races to the bottom, firms and consumers in importing 
countries will project their high regulatory standards on less developed export partners. The 
proposed mechanism is the influence exercised by pressure groups (e.g. environmental groups 
and trade unions) in importing countries, compelling importing firms to improve on these 
counts and thus to influence their suppliers abroad to do so as well.  
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 This so called ‘California effect’, first formulated in the context of environmental 
protection in the US automobile industry (see Vogel, 1995 and 1997),
5
 has been applied to 
different regulatory settings, including environmental issues (Prakash and Potoski, 2006), 
human rights (Cao, Greenhill, & Prakash, 2013) and, most relevant for our purposes, labour 
relations (Greenhill et al., 2009). Proponents of a California effect argue that Western firms 
bring their ‘best practices’ to developing nations, and that attention to labour rights within 
their supply chains tend to spill over to local firms as well (Greenhill et al., 2009).  
 With the rise of China as a major player in Africa, however, this perspective may, as 
noted, need rethinking. In a recent study Adolph et al. (2017) suggest a less optimistic 
‘Shanghai Effect’, whereby African countries trading with China begin to reflect their low 
labour standards. The authors argue that China’s non-interference policy implies that the 
Chinese government does not exert any pressure on African governments to uphold any form 
of labour standards, that the fact that China does not have independent labour union means 
that there are no activist groups to put pressure on exporters to China (or Chinese firms 
importing from abroad) regarding labour practices, and finally, that absent a free press, firms 
do not face the same kind of reputational vulnerability, even if activist groups were to protest. 
Their empirical findings, based on a panel of 49 African countries for the period 1985–2010, 
indeed indicate that increasing exports to China comes with a small negative influence on 
African labour practices, the net effect depending on the labour practices of other export 
destinations compositionally displaced by exports to China.  
 Hence, just as proponents of a California effect argue that Western firms from strong 
regulatory environments bring their ‘best practices’ to developing nations, and that these tend 
to spill over to local firms (Greenhill et al., 2009), one can make the parallel argument that the 
practices of foreign firms from weak regulatory environments can spill over to local firms 
through competitive pressures. 
 Collective labour rights – including union involvement, the focus of this paper – are 
important for production costs and thus sensitive to competitive pressures. By restricting 
collective labour rights, referring to the regulation of union formation, collective bargaining, 
and the right to strike (Caraway, 2009), firms and governments can reduce demands for wages 
and nonwage benefits and thus lower production costs (Mosley and Uno, 2007).  
                                                          
5
 As described in Vogel (1997), the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments permitted California to enact stricter 
emissions standards than the rest of the United States. And instead of states with laxer standards undermining 
those with stricter ones, California influenced other states to make their mobile emissions standards stronger, the 
proposed mechanism being that automobile producers had a strong incentive to produce vehicles that complied 
with California’s stricter standards so that they could continue to sell their cars in this large and important 
market. 
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 In the present paper we focus on the potential influence of China in their capacity as a 
major donor rather than in their role as a trading partner. Incorporating aid in a globalization 
framework is of course not new. Richards et al. (2001), for instance, use the wider measure 
‘foreign economic penetration’, including foreign aid, foreign direct investment, portfolio 
investment, and long-term debt, to capture the broad array of ways in which foreign capital 
can penetrate the economy of a developing country. What is striking when studying Chinese 
‘aid’ is how intertwined these aspects are.  
 
 2.2 Chinese aid and labour relations in Africa 
 
Chinese firms have little tradition of unions and organized labour at home. While a detailed 
survey of labour relations in China is beyond the scope of this paper, we can note that the 
International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) call attention to ‘severe restrictions on trade 
union rights’, with China not having ratified the core ILO conventions of freedom of 
association and collective bargaining (ITUC, 2010). In particular, workers are not free to form 
or join trade unions of their choice, only the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), 
which is part of the government and party bureaucracy, is recognized in law. In a study 
comparing labour right in East Asia, China scores at the bottom on both de jure and de facto 
rights. De facto rights are considered particularly fragile due to weaknesses in terms of 
political rights and rule of law, with reports of the use of arrests, detention, and violence to 
harass labour activists and suppress labour rights (Caraway, 2009).  
 As noted, labour relations between Chinese management and African workers have often 
been strained, with anecdotal evidence pointing to serious violations of international labour 
standards at Chinese investment sites in Africa (e.g. Jauch and Sakaria, 2009; Human Rights 
Watch, 2011; and Akorsu and Cooke, 2011). A report on Chinese investments and labour 
relations in Namibia (Jauch and Sakaria, 2009) highlight unfair competition resulting from 
Chinese companies not adhering with national labour laws. Interview respondents from the 
construction industry argue that the playing field in the sector is not level when it comes to 
what is legally required from Chinese and other construction companies, and that companies 
adhering to the applicable laws and minimum conditions of employment are not able to 
compete with the Chinese. As one respondent quoted in the report puts it, ‘They [the Chinese 
companies] win tenders by stealing workers’ pension funds, social security and minimum 
wages’ (Jauch and Sakaria, 2009, p. 17). To the same effect, a chief executive officer of 
Namibia Construction notes that “It has become common knowledge that Chinese contractors 
9 
 
operating in the Republic of Namibia do not regard themselves to be subject to the laws of 
this country and to that end have been allowed to break the law with impunity”. Furthermore, 
the report points to negative attitudes towards trade unions in Chinese firms, and to several 
instances where Chinese companies have come into conflict with organized labour as they 
attempted to prevent trade unions from organizing their employees. Case study evidence from 
a Chinese firm operating in Ghana indicate that whereas the employees are not prevented 
from unionizing, and while they are covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the 
agreements reached are ignored by management (Akorsu and Cooke, 2011). 
 These testimonies highlight the importance of competitive pressures in this context, i.e. 
that unfair competition resulting from Chinese companies not adhering with labour laws 
might induce local companies to do the same in order to be able to compete, resulting in a 
race to the bottom in terms of labour standards. This is central as it reveals that the presence 
of Chinese firms could impact labour standards in the recipient country, over and above their 
effect on the conditions facing their own employees, meaning that the presence of Chinese 
firms could have ripple effects on the labour standards of other firms active in the area.  
 But where does Chinese aid fit into this picture? A number of features of Chinese 
development finance arguably make it relevant for labour relations in Africa.  To begin with, 
and at the most basic level, the fact that China claims to follow a policy of non-interference in 
the domestic affairs of recipients (see e.g. Tull, 2006; Bräutigam, 2009; Tan-Mullins et al., 
2010; Dreher et al., 2016) arguably implies that they are unlikely to use their funds to promote 
civil society development and citizen participation. The principle, which is clearly spelled out 
in official Chinese documents (see e.g. State Council, 2014), is controversial
6
 and contrasts 
with that of Western donors, who often tie their aid to economic and political reforms in 
recipient countries, and whose visions on African development tend to focus on 
improvements in democracy, human rights and governance (see e.g. Jacobs, 2011). The non-
interference principle is furthermore reflected in the sectoral focus of China’s development 
finance. Whereas many Western donors have shifted their focus toward social sectors, often 
with a clearly expressed ambition to promote democratization and civil society development 
in recipient countries, the Chinese instead tend to emphasize infrastructure projects and 
productive activities (see e.g. Bräutigam, 2009). Hence, China’s non-interference policy 
coupled with the sectoral focus of their development finance seem to imply that, unlike what 
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 While recipient country governments tend to see it as a sign of China respecting their countries’ sovereignty, 
critics view it as a convenient rationale for economic involvement in undemocratic and corrupt regimes (see e.g. 
Tull, 2006; Kaplinsky et al., 2007; Naím, 2007; Pehnelt, 2007; Marantidou and Glosserman, 2015). 
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is true for many Western donors, stimulating citizen participation is not high on China’s 
development policy agenda. 
 Second, and importantly, since China tends to maintain control over development 
projects throughout the entire implementation phase, using Chinese contractors and to some 
extent also Chinese staff for work performed in the recipient countries (see e.g. Bräutigam, 
2009; Dreher et al., 2015b), their presence could reasonably exert an influence on local labour 
market institutions. As discussed above, Chinese firms have little tradition of unions and 
organized labour at home, and the fact that Chinese development projects are often 
implemented by Chinese contractors could thus arguably imply that Chinese labour relations 
are transplanted to the recipient countries. The idea that the Chinese presence is felt in the 
local area is in line with the results of Isaksson and Kotsadam (2016), which indicate that 
Chinese development projects, unlike the projects of other major donors, fuel local corruption 
in Africa.  
 Finally, and related, the fact that Chinese development finance to a great extent mixes 
commercial interests with concessional flows (see e.g. Tull, 2006; Bräutigam, 2009; Tan-
Mullins et al., 2010) likely implies that cost cutting, e.g. with respect to labour expenses, is an 
important dimension at the project implementation phase. As with the non-interference 
principle, China explicitly states that their development policy should result in a win-win 
situation for both sides (Tull, 2006). The blurring of concessional finance with other financial 
flows means that it is difficult to distinguish between China’s commercial interests and 
transfers with a development intent; their projects tend to contain elements of both. To 
illustrate, consider China's role in financing African infrastructure projects (see Liu and 
Stocken, 2012). China’s concessional loans to Africa, which today are on a scale rivaling the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in terms of development finance outreach, 
are often tied to agreements that the public tenders for construction contracts will be awarded 
to Chinese state-owned enterprises and that a great share of the procurement in terms of 
equipment, materials, technology or services must come from China.
7
 A large share of 
China’s development finance indeed cannot be classified as aid in the traditional ODA-sense 
(Bräutigam, 2009). This fact, coupled with the lack of transparency in China’s financial 
reporting, has resulted in Chinese development finance being poorly understood (Dreher et 
al., 2015). The newly available data on Chinese aid flows allows us to consider both ODA-
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 For an account of China’s impact on African manufacturing, see Bräutigam and Tang (2014). 
11 
 
like and other official flows. However, given China’s win-win approach to foreign assistance, 
commercial interests are relevant for both types of projects.   
 Against this background, it seems plausible that Chinese firms implementing 
development projects in African countries could transplant anti-union institutions from China. 
Considering the described features of Chinese development finance, coupled with testimonies 
of Chinese labour practices in Africa and the recently suggested ‘Shanghai Effect’ on African 
labour standards, it is interesting to investigate whether China’s proposed negative influence 
on labour rights in Africa also translates to the work they carry out in their capacity as a 
donor. We ask whether the Chinese choose to establish their development projects in areas 
with weaker trade unions to begin with, and whether they, through their presence, affect local 
trade union involvement. To explore whether the potential effect of Chinese development 
projects on unionization rates is part of a broader phenomenon of China transplanting 
authoritarian institutions discouraging civic participation, or whether it concerns direct 
measures to discourage union involvement specifically, we investigate whether the result for 
trade union involvement translates to other forms of participation. The results are compared 
with those for other major donors. 
 
 3 Data and Empirical strategy 
 
To analyze the effects of Chinese aid on trade union involvement in Africa, we geographically 
match new spatial data on China’s official financial flows to the continent over the period 
2000-2012 with 41,902 respondents from 18 African countries
8
 obtained from rounds 2 and 3 
of the Afrobarometer survey.  
 The data on Chinese aid projects is obtained from geo-referenced project-level data of 
AidData’s Chinese Official Finance to Africa dataset, introduced by Strange et al. (2015) and 
geocoded by Dreher et al. (2016). Since the Chinese government does not release official, 
project-level financial information about its foreign aid activities, this data is based on an 
open-source media based data collection technique, synthesizing and standardizing a large 
amount of information on Chinese development finance to African countries (described in 
detail in Strange et al., 2013 and 2015). 
 Dreher and colleagues (2015b) geocoded the data, assigning latitude and longitude co-
ordinates, and providing information about the precision of the location identified (for details 
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 Namely Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
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about the methodology used, see Strandow et al., 2011). While some development projects are 
implemented in a limited geographical area, such as a village or city, others are realized at 
more aggregate levels, such as a district or greater administrative region.  Hence, project 
locations are coded into different categories depending on the degree of precision of the 
specified location, ranging from category 1 for coordinates to an exact location to 8 when the 
location is estimated to be a seat of an administrative division or the national capital (see 
Strandow et al. 2011).  Since this paper focuses on local effects of Chinese development 
projects, we focus on projects with recorded locations coded as corresponding to an exact 
location or as ‘near’, in the ‘area’ of, or up to 25 km away from an exact location (precision 
categories 1 and 2 in Strandow et al. 2011).  
 The Chinese development projects are divided into three categories: ‘ODA-like’, ‘OOF-
like’ and ‘vague official finance’. In order to qualify as overseas development assistance 
(ODA), according to the OECD-DAC definition, an aid flow must be provided by official 
agencies to developing countries on the DAC list of ODA recipients. Moreover, it should be 
concessional, with a grant element of at least 25 percent, and its main objective should be the 
promotion of economic development of developing countries. Transactions which do not 
qualify as ODA, either because they are not primarily aimed at development or because they 
have a grant element of less than 25 per cent, are labelled ‘other official flows’, or OOF 
(OECD-DAC glossary, 2016). Due to the lack of official reporting on Chinese foreign aid 
activities, the classification used here is based on coders’ defining a project as ‘ODA-like’ or 
‘OOF-like’. When there is insufficient information to classify the project as either OOF- or 
ODA-like, it is labelled ‘vague official finance’ (see Strange et al., 2015). In the benchmark 
setup we consider all projects jointly. However, in a separate estimation we analyse ‘ODA-
like’ flows separately.9 
 We use the point coordinates in the aid data to link aid projects to local survey 
respondents in the Afrobarometer, geocoded by Knutsen et al. (2016).
10
 The coordinates of 
the surveyed Afrobarometer clusters, consisting of one or several geographically close 
villages or a neighborhood in an urban area, are used to match individuals to aid project sites 
for which we have precise point coordinates. We measure the distance from the cluster center 
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 After restricting our sample to to include only projects with precise geocodes and start-dates, there are 
unfortunately too few OOF-like projects – only 29 in total – to analyse them separately. 
10
 For a detailed description of the methodology used, see their paper. See also Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) 
who used geo-referenced data from Wave 3 of the Afrobarometer when studying effects of the slave trade on 
trust levels in Africa, and Deconinck and Verpoorten (2013), who replicated the analysis of Nunn and 
Wantchekon using Wave 4 of the Afrobarometer survey.  
13 
 
points to the aid project sites and identify the clusters located within a cut-off distance of at 
least one project site.  
 Restricting our sample to projects with precise geocodes and start-dates we cover 403 
Chinese project sites. Figure 1 shows a map including the aid projects along with 50 km 
buffer zones around each Afrobarometer cluster. While we have a good spread of both 
projects and survey data, some countries are not covered by the Afrobarometer. Focusing on 
the countries included in the Afrobarometer, we cover 209 project sites. Furthermore, in some 
cases, aid projects are too far away from any survey cluster even if we have both types of 
information in the same country. 
 Our main dependent variable focuses on individual trade union involvement. As noted, 
union involvement captures a central dimension of collective labour rights, which in turn are 
important for production costs (Mosley and Uno, 2007; Caraway, 2009). Importantly, union 
involvement should reflect de facto as opposed to de jure labour rights, i.e. enforcement of 
and compliance with labour regulations rather than merely their content.  Considering that we 
seek to examine local influences of a more informal nature – we expect that a Chinese 
presence in a locality can influence local firm practices on the unionization of staff rather than 
the content of actual labour law – this focus appears reasonable. It is furthermore important to 
note that union involvement is not only an expression of de facto collective labour rights; it is 
also a central form of citizen engagement. Being interested in whether a potential Chinese 
influence on union involvement also translates to other form of political participation, thus 
capturing wider institutional change, we will for comparison explore a range of other 
participatory outcomes.  
 To measure union involvement, we employ an Afrobarometer question, available in 
waves 2 and 3 of the survey, asking if the respondent is an official leader, an active member, 
an inactive member, or not a member of a trade union or farmers association.
11
 In our baseline 
estimations we use a dummy variable simply indicating if the respondent is a union member. 
In alternative specifications, however, we use an ordinal variable also capturing the 
individual’s extent of involvement (i.e. whether he or she is an inactive or active member or a 
leader). Our main explanatory variables, which will be described in greater detail below, 
focus on living near a Chinese project site – either a site where a project is being implemented 
                                                          
11
 Considering the somewhat ambiguous formulation, making no distinction between trade unions and farmers 
associations, in alternative estimations we restrict the sample to urban areas and to people employed outside of 
the farm sector, with no change in the interpretation of our results.   
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at the time of the survey or a site where a project will be opened but where implementation 
had not yet been initiated at the time of the survey.  
                  
 3.1 Estimation strategy 
 
Our spatial-temporal estimation strategy resembles that used in and Knutsen et al. (2016).
12
 In 
particular, we distinguish between sites where a Chinese development project is actually 
under implementation and sites where a project will be opened but where implementation had 
not yet been initiated at the time of the survey. While the fact that the Afrobarometer does not 
have a panel structure hinders us from following specific localities over time, before and after 
the arrival of a Chinese project, with this estimation strategy we can still compare areas 
selected as project sites before and during project implementation, thus making use of the 
time variation in the data. 
 Assuming that union involvement is affected within a cut-off distance of a project, our 
main identification strategy includes three groups of individuals, namely those 1) within 50 
km of at least one site with an ongoing Chinese project, 2) within 50 km of a site where a 
Chinese project will start, but where implementation was yet to start at the survey date, but 
not close to any ongoing projects, and 3) more than 50 km from any Chinese project site. Our 
baseline regression is: 
 
ivtitsivt futureprojectongoingprojectUnion   X__)1( 21  
 
That is, the union involvement of an individual i in cluster v at year t is regressed – in the 
benchmark setup using easy-to-interpret OLS and linear probability models
13
 – on a dummy 
variable project_ongoing capturing whether the individual lives within 50 kilometers of an 
ongoing Chinese development project, and a dummy project_future for living close to a site 
where a Chinese project is planned but not yet implemented at the time of the survey. To 
control for variation in average unionization rates across time and space, the regressions 
include spatial fixed effects (𝛼𝑠) – in the benchmark setup 217 sub-national region dummies 
– and year fixed effects (𝛿𝑡). To control for individual variation in union involvement, we 
include a vector (𝐗𝑖) of individual-level controls from the Afrobarometer. Our baseline set of 
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 See also Kotsadam and Tolonen (2016) and Isaksson and Kotsadam (2016). 
13
 Instead calculating marginal effects after probit regressions does not change the interpretation of any results.  
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individual controls are age, age squared, gender, urban/rural residence.
14
 To account for 
correlated errors, the standard errors are clustered at the geographical clusters (EA, town or 
neighborhood). For variable descriptions and summary statistics, see Tables A1-A2.  
   As described in detail in Isaksson and Kotsadam (2016), interpreting the coefficient on 
project_ongoing (𝛽1) in isolation as capturing an effect of Chinese development projects on 
union involvement would necessitate that the location of Chinese development projects is not 
correlated with pre-existing rates of unionization. Considering that Chinese project location 
decisions most likely are influenced by the pre-existing characteristics of project sites, such as 
the rate of union involvement and other factors correlated with unions (consider e.g. 
population density, economic activity and infrastructure access), this assumption appears 
unreasonable ex-ante. However, including project_future allows us to compare sites with 
ongoing projects to other areas selected as locations for Chinese projects, but where the 
project were yet to be initiated at the time of the survey. That is, we can compare areas before 
a project has been implemented with areas where a project is currently under implementation, 
and not only areas close to and far away from project sites. For all regressions, we therefore 
provide test results for the difference between project_ongoing and project_future (i.e. 
𝛽1 − 𝛽2), giving us a difference-in-difference type of measure
15
 that controls for unobservable 
time-invariant characteristics that may influence selection into being a Chinese project site.  
 Moreover, for a restricted sample of areas that have observations from both before and 
after a Chinese aid project started –  while the Afrobarometer survey does not have a panel 
structure, in some cases it happens to revisit the same localities in different survey waves – we 
run project fixed effects estimations investigating the changes over time at a given place. 
 Being interested in whether Chinese development projects leave a footprint on local 
institutions, we need to make an assumption about the geographical reach of this mark. 
Ultimately, this should depend on the mechanisms by which we believe Chinese projects 
impact unionization rates. If anti-union policies at Chinese firms implementing development 
projects result in competitive pressures inducing local companies to enter a race to the bottom 
in terms of labour standards, one may expect wider implications, both in terms of scope and 
geographical reach. If, on the other hand, they primarily affect those directly involved at the 
Chinese project sites, the effects would naturally be more limited. As discussed in Knutsen et 
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 The results are robust to altering this set of controls, e.g. leaving out the control variables entirely or adding 
potentially endogenous controls for education, employment and economic standing. 
15
 Comparing the difference between post-treatment individuals (with an ongoing Chinese project within 50 km) 
and control individuals (with no Chinese project – ongoing or future – within 50 km) with the difference 
between pre-treatment individuals (with a future Chinese project within 50 km) and control individuals within 
the same country/region and year (due to country/region and year fixed effects). 
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al. (2016), the appropriate cut-off distance from a project – within which an individual will be 
considered treated – is a trade-off between noise and size of the treatment group. With a too 
small cut-off distance, we get a small sample of individuals linked to ongoing and future 
project sites. On the other hand, a too large cut-off distance would include too many untreated 
individuals into the treatment group, leading to attenuation bias. Following Knutsen et al. 
(2016), we use a 50 km cut-off in the main specification, but also present results using 
alternative cut-offs (25 and 75 km).  
 
 4 Results 
 
 4.1 Main results 
 
The results indicate that Chinese development projects tend to decrease the rate of union 
involvement. Table 1 presents the results of our baseline estimations, which focus on the 
union involvement of respondents living within 50 kilometers of project sites and include the 
baseline individual controls, year fixed effects and country or 217 sub-national region 
dummies (in Columns 1 and 2, respectively). Looking at the coefficients on project_ongoing, 
we can note that living within 50 kilometers of sites where Chinese projects are currently 
being implemented is associated with a smaller probability of being a union member. The 
point estimates are sizeable; compared to individuals in the same country who do not live 
close to any Chinese project site, respondents with an ongoing project in their vicinity are 
approximately 7 percentage points less likely to be a member of a union.  
 As noted, however, interpreting the coefficient on project_ongoing in isolation as 
capturing an effect of Chinese development projects on union involvement requires that the 
location of Chinese development projects is not correlated with pre-existing unionization 
rates. In order to account for the likely endogenous placement of projects we use a difference-
in-difference type of approach, comparing union involvement in areas close to sites where a 
Chinese project is currently being implemented (project_ongoing) with equivalent rates in 
areas close to sites where a Chinese project will take place but where implementation was yet 
to be initiated at the time of the survey (project_future). Looking at the coefficient on 
project_future in Column 1 it seems that Chinese projects tend to be located in areas with 
lower pre-existing unionization rates. Hence, if not accounting for this tendency we would 
overestimate the effect of the Chinese presence. Accounting for sub-national regional 
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variation (Column 2) this parameter is no longer statistically significant. Nonetheless, we 
should account for the strong possibility that sites selected for Chinese development projects 
differ from other areas in respects relevant for labour relations. 
 As it turns out, however, the difference-in-difference estimates (β1 − β2) and associated 
test results presented in the bottom rows of Table 1 clearly indicate lower rates of union 
involvement close to ongoing as compared to future Chinese project sites.  In the country 
dummy specification, the difference is around 4 percentage points. In the more restrictive 
setup controlling for sub-national regional variation (henceforth used), this difference 
becomes larger; in comparison with people in the same region/province living close to future 
Chinese project sites, individuals living near sites where Chinese projects are currently being 
implemented are 7 percentage points less likely to be a union member. The difference is 
highly statistically significant.  
 
 4.2 Sensitivity analysis 
 
The results are remarkably stable across a wide range of different specifications. In Table 2, 
we first test whether altering the cut-off distance from project sites changes our results, using 
a 25 kilometer cut-off in Column 1 and a 75 kilometer cut-off in Column 2. In both cases, the 
results still indicate lower union involvement near ongoing as compared to future Chinese 
project sites. And again, the differences are both sizeable and highly statistically significant. 
Furthermore, and as might be expected, the estimated difference between the two is larger 
when using a smaller cut-off, i.e. when considering the more immediate surrounding of the 
project site rather than a wider area, seemingly suggesting that the observed effects wear off 
with distance.  We can also note that when using the 75 kilometer cut-off, people living near 
future Chinese project sites are actually more likely to be union members than people living 
near no Chinese project site, highlighting the importance of controlling for selection into 
being a project site.   
 In the benchmark setup we exclude respondents who live within the cut-off distance of a 
site where a Chinese project has been completed prior to the interview date (approximately 15 
percent of respondents). The argument is that this may otherwise bias the effect of having an 
ongoing project nearby, e.g. by lowering union involvement among supposedly untreated 
individuals or by interfering with the effect of treated individuals living close to ongoing or 
future project sites. In Column 3, however, we instead keep these individuals in the 
regression, but include a dummy variable to control for having a completed project within the 
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cut-off distance. The results remain unchanged. Moreover, we can note that the negative 
coefficient on the dummy for having a completed project nearby is, while statistically 
different from living near an ongoing project, not quite statistically different from zero, 
seemingly suggesting that after a Chinese project has been completed, its negative effect on 
union involvement wears off. 
 Calculating the marginal effects from a probit estimation rather than using LPM (Column 
4) does not change the interpretation of the results. Furthermore, the results are robust to 
altering the set of baseline control variables by adding potentially endogenous controls for 
education, employment and economic standing (Column 5). In our baseline estimations our 
dependent variable is a dummy simply indicating if the respondent is a union member. As can 
be seen in Column 6, however, instead using an ordinal dependent variable also capturing the 
individual’s extent of union involvement (i.e. whether he or she is an inactive or active 
member or a leader) does not change the result that Chinese development projects tend to 
decrease the rate of union involvement. In particular, the difference between ongoing and 
future is 0.13, which is quite sizeable in relation to the sample mean of 0.33 on the ordinal 
dependent variable. Moreover, and as seen in Column 7, restricting the sample to include only 
countries that had both ongoing and future Chinese aid projects at the time of the 
Afrobarometer survey rounds (Ghana, Kenya, Mali, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda) does 
not change our findings. In the benchmark setup we considered ‘ODA-like’ and ‘OOF-like’ 
projects jointly. One might suspect anti-union policies to be stronger in projects of a 
commercial as opposed to projects of a concessional character. However, analyzing ‘ODA-
like’ flows separately (Column 8), the results remain unchanged, highlighting China’s 
tendency to mix commercial interests with concessional flows discussed in Section 2. If 
anything, the difference in union involvement between respondents living near ongoing and 
future Chinese projects is actually larger than in the benchmark setup.  
 Moreover, we can note that the results hold in both urban and rural sub-samples 
(Columns 9-10). This is reassuring seeing that the question our dependent variable is based on 
is somewhat ambiguous in that it asks if the respondent is a member of a ‘trade union or 
farmers association’. The results also hold both in a sub-sample of respondent claiming to 
have a job that pays cash income and in a sub-sample that do not (Columns 11-12). As might 
be expected, the effect is seemingly larger in the former. That we also find an effect among 
those who claim not to have a job that pays cash income is not necessarily surprising 
considering that the question could be interpreted as referring to a permanent position while a 
large share of respondents are likely to only have experience of temporary employment. 
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Similarly, we split the sample into two groups depending on their sector of employment. We 
classify all people working with farming (subsistence farmers, peasant farmers, commercial 
farmers, and farm workers) as farmers and we see that there is an effect of in both samples 
(Columns 13 and 14).  
 
 4.3 Exploring threats to identification: Project timing 
 
While the year dummies included in all regressions will control for general differences across 
years in union involvement, there may be timing effects relating specifically to the evolution 
of Chinese aid. Here it is important to note that there is no direct correspondence between 
time of project implementation and ongoing/future project status. Both Afrobarometer survey 
waves covered contain observations connected to both ongoing and future Chinese project 
sites, meaning that we have variation in project status for both projects implemented earlier 
and projects implemented later. Hence, a project implemented comparatively early may well 
be coded as a future project, all depending on at what point in time the Afrobarometer 
surveyed that particular area. That said, however, there are somewhat more respondents 
connected to ongoing project sites in the later survey wave.
16
 And perhaps more importantly, 
since the aid project data reaches until 2012 and the Afrobarometer data used covers 2002-
2006, all projects starting after 2006 will be coded as future. With this in mind, a potential 
concern is that projects starting later differ systematically from projects starting earlier. 
  The fact that the coefficient on future is not statistically significant when controlling for 
regional variation suggests that, on average, areas selected for Chinese project sites do not 
stand out in terms of pre-existing levels of union involvement. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to 
explore whether our results are affected by a different character of Chinese aid projects 
implemented, or project sites selected, early and late in the covered period. 
 To address these concerns, we first run our baseline regressions focusing on the 
individual survey wave sub-samples (Columns 1-2 in Table 3). The negative effect of Chinese 
aid projects on union involvement is present in both sub-samples. Notably, though, it is larger 
in the earlier sub-sample – with a parameter difference of 13 percentage points between 
ongoing and future to be compared with an equivalent difference of 5 percentage points in the 
later sub-sample – providing some suggestive evidence of improvements in the control of 
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 In particular, in the earlier survey wave (Afrobarometer wave 2) 8 percent of respondent are connected to an 
ongoing project within 50 kilometres and 22 percent to a future project. In the later survey wave (Afrobarometer 
wave 3), the equivalent figures are 12 and 17 percent, respectively. 
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labour practices in Chinese firms implementing development projects. Furthermore, in neither 
of the sub-samples is the coefficient on future statistically significant, suggesting that the 
pattern observed in the full sample – i.e. that areas selected for Chinese project sites do not 
stand out in terms of pre-existing levels of union involvement – has not changed markedly 
over the period.  
 However, we still cannot rule out that the results are driven by a changing character of the 
projects starting after 2006, all of which are coded as future in our benchmark estimation. For 
instance, if later projects tend to locate in areas with greater trade union involvement to begin 
with, this would inflate the negative difference between ongoing and future. To investigate if 
the results withstand excluding the post-2006 projects we run an estimation focusing on 
projects starting in 2006 or earlier (Column 3). The results remain unchanged, the estimated 
difference between ongoing and future in fact being very similar to in the benchmark setup 
(Table 1). Furthermore, the parameter on future is still not statistically different from zero, 
suggesting that it was not the inclusion of post-2006 projects that drove this relationship. 
 Finally, we run project fixed effects estimations, meaning that we restrict the sample to 
areas that have observations from both before and after a Chinese aid project started and 
investigate the changes over time at a given place. Although the Afrobarometer survey does 
not have a panel structure, in some cases it happens to revisit the same localities in different 
survey waves. In total, there are 60 project locations for which we have data on union 
membership from both before and after a Chinese aid project started. While losing a large 
share of our sample, the advantage of this approach is of course that it allows us to evaluate 
variation in trade union involvement occurring around a project site before and after a project 
was initiated. In column 4 we present the results (note that since we now focus on variation 
over time in specific project sites, we can directly interpret the coefficient on ongoing), which 
indicate that unionization went down significantly after the implementation of a Chinese aid 
project commenced in the area. The implied effect is sizeable, suggesting a 20 percentage 
point lower probability of the respondent being a trade union member after project 
implementation started. 
 Hence, while Chinese development finance may have evolved over time, our results are 
not driven by a distinct shift in Chinese aid practices or in the character of sites selected for 
Chinese aid projects.  
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4.4 Exploring heterogeneity across sub-samples 
 
In Table 4 we explore possible heterogeneities across different sub-samples. First we consider 
whether the strength of pre-existing labour rights in recipient countries affects to what extent 
Chinese projects impact local union involvement. Presumably, countries with more well 
specified labour rights are better able to control possible labour violations of Chinese 
contractors. We use the country level labour rights indicator of Mosley and Uno (2007), 
which focuses on the rights of workers to act collectively – to form unions, to bargain 
collectively, and to strike – in the period up to 2002,17 and split our countries at the sample 
median score into two groups, one with comparatively stronger and one with comparatively 
weaker labour rights (Columns 1 and 2, respectively).
18
 As might be expected, the results are 
stronger in the latter sub-sample. In the sample consisting of the nine sample countries with 
comparatively weaker labour rights in 2002, the difference in union involvement near ongoing 
as compared to future Chinese project sites is big – ten percentage points – and highly 
statistically significant. In the sub-sample with relatively stronger labour rights in 2002, the 
difference is – while still in the expected direction – smaller and not quite statistically 
significant at conventional levels, possibly suggesting that these countries are better able to 
enforce labour regulations and maintain domestic labour relations among Chinese contractors.  
 Next, we consider whether the amount of Chinese development finance received affects 
the extent to which Chinese projects impact local union involvement. Reasonably, larger 
projects should impact local labour relations more than smaller projects. The estimated aid 
volumes going to specific projects, obtained through the open-source media based data 
collection technique described in Section 3, are likely to contain some measurement error. 
Nonetheless, we use each country’s estimated total volume of Chinese development finance to 
roughly distinguish countries with a greater Chinese presence from countries with a more 
limited Chinese involvement (Columns 3-4).
19
 As expected, the results are stronger in the 
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 In order not to capture the possible impact of Chinese aid on labour rights we purposively use an indicator 
from before the main surge in Chinese development finance to Africa.   
18
 The former group consists of Cape Verde, Ghana, Lesotho, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal, South 
Africa and Zambia, and the latter group consists of Benin, Botswana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Nigeria, 
Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe. 
19
 The former group contains Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe, and the latter group contains Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Namibia and Senegal. 
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sample containing countries receiving relatively more Chinese aid, where they indicate a 
highly statistically significant difference of six percentage points between the union 
involvement of respondents living near ongoing and future Chinese project sites. In the sub-
sample with comparatively limited Chinese involvement, the difference is – while again in the 
expected direction – not statistically significant. However, we should note that this rough 
distinction does not take into account the size of countries, neither in terms of population nor 
surface area, and that smaller countries tend to receive less aid in absolute terms.  
 Taken together, we thus get some indications of heterogeneity across sub-samples. In 
particular, the observed negative effect of Chinese development projects on labour union 
involvement appears stronger in countries with weaker labour rights to begin with and in 
countries that receive more Chinese aid.  
 
 4.5 Exploring mechanisms 
 
First of all, one may ask if the observed lower union involvement close to Chinese project 
sites is the result of changing labour market involvement. While arguably somewhat counter-
intuitive, if people near Chinese project sites are less likely to be employed, this could explain 
why they are also less likely to be trade union members. Rather than creating job 
opportunities, one could argue that the competition from Chinese contractors may push local 
companies out of business. The results in Table 5, focusing on the effect of living near a 
Chinese aid project on the probability of having wage employment and of being a farmer, 
respectively, do not support this story. We can note that whereas people living near ongoing 
as compared to future Chinese project sites do not stand out in terms of the probability of 
engaging in farming, they are 15 percentage points more likely to be in wage employment. 
This result provides suggestive evidence that Chinese aid projects do in fact stimulate 
employment, making the lower trade union involvement in these same areas even more 
noteworthy.  
 Second, one may ask if the observed negative effect of Chinese development projects on 
unionization rates is part of a broader phenomenon. Presumably China could, by their very 
presence, transplant authoritarian institutions discouraging civic participation in a wider 
sense. Alternatively, the suggested use of direct measures to discourage union involvement at 
Chinese investment sites could, through competitive pressures on the local economy, affect 
local labour rights specifically. Whereas the former should imply that the Chinese presence 
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has a negative impact on different forms of civic engagement, and not only trade union 
involvement, the latter should first and foremost affect unionization.  
 To investigate whether the result for trade union involvement translates to other forms of 
participation, Table 6 presents the results of estimations focusing on being a member of 
voluntary organizations / community groups, attending community meetings, joining with 
others to raise an issue and taking part in demonstrations. As it turns out, there is no consistent 
pattern for these types of political participation that are not directly tied to people’s 
employment. In line with the results for union membership, individuals living close to 
ongoing as opposed to future Chinese project sites are less likely to be members of voluntary 
organizations (Column 1), again suggesting a negative effect on collective organization. 
However, we observe no equivalent difference in community meeting attendance (Column 2) 
or in the tendency to take part in demonstrations (Column 4), and people living near ongoing 
as compared to future Chinese project sites are actually more likely to have joined with others 
to raise an issue (Column 3). A possible interpretation of the latter is that it indicates the use 
of informal substitutes to formal organization in areas with Chinese involvement. Overall, 
though, the fact that we do not find the equivalent influence of a Chinese presence on 
participation not directly connected to the workplace seems to indicate that the lower 
unionization rates observed near ongoing as compared to future Chinese project sites stem 
from direct anti-union policies at Chinese-led investment sites rather than from more general 
institutional change.  
  
 4.6 Comparing with other donors 
 
Our results consistently indicate that Chinese development projects have a negative impact on 
union involvement. Do the Chinese stand out from other donors in this respect? Indeed, we 
have argued that China’s non-interference policy, their tendency to use Chinese contractors 
and staff to implement their projects, and their inclination to mix commercial interests with 
concessional flows make them different from traditional donors. In contrast, many Western 
donors have a clearly expressed ambition to promote good governance and citizen 
engagement in recipient countries. The aid branch at the World Bank, for instance, has 
‘Governance and Institutions’ as one of its central pillars, and emphasizes the goal to promote 
citizen participation to hold governments and private sector partners accountable (IDA, 2016). 
Furthermore, they reward governance improvements in their aid allocation, having a 
performance based allocation rule that gives significant weight to country performance ratings 
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in terms of institutional development and governance (Bourguignon and Gunning, 2016). In 
this section we compare the Chinese results to those obtained for World Bank development 
projects, for which there is also geo-referenced data available for a large multi-country 
African sample, as well as for other bilateral donors for a sub-sample of countries. 
 As it turns out, the equivalent results for World Bank projects display a very different 
pattern (see Table 7). There is indeed a statistically and economically significant difference in 
union involvement between people living close to ongoing World Bank projects and people 
living in areas where the World Bank project was yet to be initiated at the time of the survey. 
However, in contrast to the results for Chinese development projects, the difference is 
positive, suggesting that World Bank projects stimulate union involvement. The literature on 
trade based regulatory diffusion, recently emphasizing that an exporting developing country is 
likely to face conflicting pressures from different importing countries with different 
regulatory standards (e.g. Greenhill et al., 2009; Adolph et al., 2017), is relevant in this 
context. Considering the effect of different donors on union involvement, we arguably 
observe the equivalent of a positive ‘California effect’ of World Bank aid, and of a negative 
‘Shanghai effect’ of Chinese aid. Hence, just as previous studies have suggested 
heterogeneous trade based regulatory diffusion, the results arguably speak in favor of 
heterogeneous aid driven regulatory diffusion.  
 Furthermore, the results for World Bank projects seemingly reflect a broader pattern, in 
line with World Bank efforts to promote civil society development and community 
participation. Looking at Column 2, we can note World Bank projects also seem to encourage 
membership in other voluntary organizations. As for Chinese projects, the effects on union 
membership and membership in other organizations thus go in the same direction, seemingly 
indicating that these two variables capture some common element of collective organization. 
Whereas we for Chinese projects find that this effect is negative, discouraging collective 
organization, World Bank projects instead seem to encourage the same. The estimated 
parameter of having an ongoing World Bank project nearby is positive and statistically 
significant for both community meeting attendance (Column 3) and joining with others to 
raise issues (Column 4). However, the fact that there is no statistically significant difference 
between ongoing and future suggests that the result is driven by a tendency to locate World 
Bank projects in areas with higher political participation to begin with, rather than it being an 
effect of the projects themselves. On the other hand, World Bank projects appear to make 
people in the local area less inclined to attend demonstrations and protest marches (Column 
5), possibly indicating that their presence help reduce social unrest (or discontent).   
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 Chinese development finance to Africa is often suggested to focus on infrastructure 
investments (Bräutigam, 2009), a sector that has been singled out as particularly problematic 
in terms of Chinese violations of African labour laws (Jauch and Sakaria, 2009). Could this be 
what drives the different effects of Chinese and World Bank development projects on union 
involvement? Considering that the geographical coding precision tends to reflect the sectoral 
composition of aid (Dreher and Lohmann, 2015), the mere fact that we focus on projects with 
equally precise geocodes arguably makes the selection of Chinese and World Bank projects 
more comparable. Moreover, inspecting the sectoral shares of our sample of Chinese and 
World Bank projects, we can note that while ‘Transport and storage’ indeed receives the 
largest share of our Chinese sample projects – 21 percent – this is in fact true for World Bank 
projects as well. Indeed, the share of projects going to the transport sector is even larger – 34 
percent – for World Bank projects. Nevertheless, we want to explore if World Bank projects 
have a negative effect on union involvement if focusing on the transport sector alone. As it 
turns out, they do not. The results of estimations including only World Bank projects to the 
transport sector are presented in Table A3, and suggest no statistically significant effect. If 
anything, the difference between ongoing and future is still positive. Looking at projects to 
the transport alone we unfortunately do not have enough variation to run the corresponding 
estimations for Chinese projects. In particular, only one country – Uganda – had ongoing 
Chinese transport projects at the time of the survey, and they have no observations connected 
to future projects. 
 Do the contrasting results – with Chinese development projects discouraging and World 
Bank projects encouraging union involvement – simply reflect differences in the impact of 
bilateral and multilateral aid? Indeed, a common argument is that bilateral aid is often tied to 
the political agenda of the donor country and that it is less focused on promoting good 
governance in the recipient country (see e.g. Charron, 2011). To investigate if the bilateral-
multilateral distinction is what drives the observed differences among donors, in a next step 
we compare the Chinese results to those of other bilateral donors. As of yet, there is little 
geocoded aid data for bilateral donors other than China. However, for a small selection of 
African countries, namely Nigeria, Uganda, Malawi and Senegal, bilateral aid project data has 
been geocoded on a wider scale.  
 The estimation in Table 8, Column 1, suggests no effect of other bilateral aid on union 
involvement in these countries. If anything, the difference between ongoing and future is 
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positive – i.e. in line with the World Bank results rather than the Chinese results.20 
Considering other forms of participation (Columns 2-5), in contrast with Chinese projects and 
in line with World Bank projects, other bilateral projects seem to encourage membership in 
voluntary organizations. We find no effects on the other outcomes. While the limited sample 
prevents us from drawing any far reaching conclusions with respect to the effect of other 
bilateral aid on union involvement, we can note that the results for Chinese projects stand out 
from both World Bank and other bilateral aid.  
 
 5 Conclusions 
 
While testimonies from Chinese investment sites in Africa point to serious violations of 
international labour standards, there is a lack of statistical evidence to corroborate these 
allegations on a wider scale. Considering that China tends to be heavily involved throughout 
the implementation phase of development projects, using profit-seeking Chinese contractors 
for work performed in the recipient countries, the present paper examined whether China 
impacts African labour practices in their capacity as a donor. 
 Specifically, we used a new data material allowing for systematic quantitative analysis of 
Chinese development finance to investigate whether Chinese development projects affect 
local trade union involvement. Matching geo-referenced data on the subnational allocation of 
Chinese development projects to Africa over the 2000-2012 period with 41,902 survey 
respondents across 18 African countries, our estimation strategy relies on comparing the trade 
union involvement of individuals who live near a site where a Chinese project was being 
implemented at the time of the interview to those of individuals living near a site where a 
Chinese project will appear in the future, but where implementation had yet to be initiated at 
the time of the survey.  
 The results consistently indicate that Chinese development projects discourage trade 
union involvement in the local areas. These results do not translate to other forms of citizen 
participation, seemingly indicating that the lower unionization rates observed near ongoing as 
compared to future Chinese project sites stem from direct measures to discourage union 
involvement rather than from more general institutional change. The relatively wide 
geographical reach of the observed effect arguably provides suggestive evidence that 
                                                          
20
 Again, there is unfortunately too little variation in project status to be able to run estimations for Chinese 
projects on the same sub-sample of countries.  
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restrictions in collective labour rights at Chinese project sites affect the labour practices of 
other firms active in the area, pointing to the importance of competitive pressures. 
 Interestingly, the negative effect of Chinese development projects on union involvement 
clearly diverges from the observed effects of aid projects of other bilateral and multilateral 
donors. In particular, in line with World Bank efforts to promote civil society development 
and community participation, World Bank projects are found to stimulate rather than to 
discourage union involvement as well as membership in other voluntary organizations. The 
paper thus provides suggestive evidence in support of effective institutional/governance aid to 
encourage citizen participation, while at the same time highlighting important donor 
heterogeneity in outcomes. Further research is needed to explore aid effectiveness 
disaggregated by sector and donor. 
 In line with the literature suggesting heterogeneous trade based regulatory diffusion, the 
results speak in favor of important donor variation in what can be seen as a corresponding aid 
driven regulatory diffusion, pointing to a positive ‘California effect’ of World Bank aid and a 
negative ‘Shanghai effect’ of Chinese aid on African union involvement. Hence, while the 
recently suggested Shanghai effect refers to the role of Chinese trade for African labour 
rights, the results of this paper highlight an alternative channel through which China impacts 
African labour practices, namely in their capacity as a major donor. As such, the paper 
contributes to the literature on the impact of globalization on countries’ regulatory standards, 
to the emerging quantitative literature exploring the until recently poorly understood Chinese 
aid, and to the growing number of studies using subnational geocoded aid data to examine the 
determinants and impacts of the allocation of foreign aid within countries. 
 Our findings corroborate anecdotal evidence of collective labour rights restrictions at 
Chinese production sites in Africa, and in doing so, point to the relevance of monitoring 
Chinese contractors implementing developing projects to make sure that they abide by 
national labour laws and international labour standards. The international donor community 
could play a role in this context; for donor to be able to cooperate and coordinate effectively, 
and to get all major players to abide by common regulations, there is a need for a serious 
effort to invite China to the table. 
 On a more general level, the changing global economic landscape call for a renewed 
focus on the implications and challenges of development cooperation in general, and for an 
understanding of the implications of the rise of new actors and financial flows in particular. 
The results of the present paper demonstrate that with commercial and concessional flows 
being increasingly intertwined, there is a need for a broader view when analyzing the impacts 
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of aid. The changing aid landscape warrants both the question ‘what constitutes aid’ and 
‘within what analytical framework do we best study new aid actors and practices’. 
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Table 1: Chinese aid and union involvement – main results 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Union member Union member 
   
Ongoing50 -0.070*** -0.068*** 
 (0.012) (0.016) 
Future50 -0.030*** 0.003 
 (0.009) (0.012) 
Baseline controls YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Country FE YES NO 
Region FE NO YES 
Diff-in-diff ongoing-future -0.0395 -0.0710 
F test: ongoing-future=0 8.493 13.32 
P value of F test 0.00359 0.000267 
Observations 33,212 29,954 
R-squared 0.062 0.101 
Robust standard errors(clustered by the survey clusters) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2: Robustness checks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
VARIABLES 
25 km cutoff 75 km cutoff Completed Probit 
More 
controls 
Ordinal 
Small  
sample
a
  
ODA 
projects 
Urban Rural A job No job Farmer Not 
Farmer 
               
ongoing25 -0.074***              
 (0.016)              
future25 -0.001              
 (0.012)              
ongoing75  -0.032**             
  (0.016)             
future75  0.026**             
  (0.012)             
ongoing50   -0.069*** -.064*** -0.077*** -0.117*** -0.057*** -0.090*** -0.075*** -0.077*** -0.081*** -0.060*** -0.092*** -0.054*** 
   (0.014) (0.012) (0.016) (0.031) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.022) (0.019) (0.031) (0.015) 
future50   0.005 .002 0.004 0.012 -0.003 0.008 -0.031** 0.014 -0.002 0.004 0.006 -0.003 
   (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.024) (0.024) (0.011) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.014) (0.019) (0.012) 
suspended50   -0.017            
   (0.014)            
Diff-in-diff ongoing-future -0.0724 -0.0573 -0.0739 -.066 -0.0808 -0.129 -0.0537 -0.0975 -0.0439 -0.0907 -0.0798 -0.0639 -0.0985 -0.0502 
F test: ongoing-future=0 12.32 9.069 14.55 15.69 15.38 10.46 3.866 20.58 4.639 10.19 10.02 7.708 8.904 8.104 
P value of F test 0.000454 0.00262 0.000138 0.0001 8.97e-05 0.00123 0.0495 5.94e-06 0.0314 0.00144 0.00156 0.00553 0.00288 0.00444 
Observations 29,242 30,880 35,388 29910 29,635 29,954 10,807 28,680 13,270 16,684 11,141 18,718 8,144 21,606 
R-squared 0.101 0.100 0.095  0.109 0.101 0.085 0.100 0.074 0.119 0.105 0.124 0.134 0.081 
Robust standard errors (clustered by the survey clusters) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Note that column 4 presents marginal effects from a probit estimation, the presented difference in difference 
here refers to the difference between the concerned marginal effects, and the test-statistic  and associated p-value to a chi2 distribution. All regressions control for the baseline controls as well as year and region 
fixed effects. a In column 7 the sample is to include only countries that had both ongoing and future Chinese aid projects at the time of the Afrobarometer survey rounds (Ghana, Kenya, Mali, South Africa, Tanzania 
and Uganda). 
 
Table 3: Evaluating identification: project timing 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Wave 2 Wave 3 Projects before 2007 Project fixed effects 
     
ongoing50 -0.128*** -0.048** -0.062*** -0.199*** 
 (0.026) (0.021) (0.019) (0.075) 
future50 0.005 0.003 0.001  
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.013)  
Baseline controls YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Region FE YES YES YES YES 
Project FE NO NO NO YES 
Diff-in-diff ongoing-future -0.133 -0.0506 -0.0624  
F test: ongoing-future=0 17.33 2.923 9.323  
p value of F test 3.38e-05 0.0875 0.00228  
Observations 8,672 19,141 24,412 10,958 
R-squared 0.076 0.113 0.104 0.112 
Robust standard errors (clustered by the survey clusters) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Dependent variable is Union 
member. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Chinese aid and union involvement – sub-sample heterogeneity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES stronger labor rights weaker labor rights More chinese aid Less Chinese  
aid 
     
ongoing50 -0.043* -0.085*** -0.065*** -0.036 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.015) (0.083) 
future50 -0.006 0.012 -0.003 0.014 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
     
Baseline controls YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Region FE YES YES YES YES 
Diff-in-diff ongoing-future -0.0368 -0.0961 -0.0620 -0.0504 
F test: ongoing-future=0 2.507 12.50 11.18 0.359 
p value of F test 0.113 0.000423 0.000839 0.549 
Observations 15,643 14,311 18,172 11,782 
R-squared 0.100 0.102 0.094 0.116 
Robust standard errors (clustered by the survey clusters) in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 5: Chinese aid and labour market involvement 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Wage worker Farmer 
   
Ongoing50 0.130*** -0.010 
 (0.025) (0.026) 
Future50 -0.020 -0.013 
 (0.020) (0.024) 
Baseline controls YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Country FE NO NO 
Region FE YES YES 
Diff-in-diff ongoing-future 0.149 0.00252 
F test: ongoing-future=0 24.32 0.00459 
p value of F test 8.52e-07 0.946 
Observations 29,859 29,750 
R-squared 0.183 0.307 
Robust standard errors (clustered by the survey clusters) in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Chinese aid and other forms of participation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Member of other 
organisation 
Attend community 
meetings 
Raised issue Demonstrated 
     
ongoing50 -0.042** 0.009 0.051*** -0.011 
 (0.021) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) 
future50 0.026* 0.022* 0.004 0.006 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) 
Baseline controls YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Region FE YES YES YES YES 
Diff-in-diff ongoing-future -0.0681 -0.0135 0.0470 -0.0167 
F test: ongoing-future=0 6.645 0.533 5.523 1.312 
p value of F test 0.00998 0.465 0.0188 0.252 
Observations 29,954 29,765 29,687 29,328 
R-squared 0.116 0.157 0.128 0.074 
Robust standard errors (clustered by the survey clusters) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 7: World Bank aid projects  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
Union member 
Member of other 
organisation 
Attend community 
meetings 
Raised issue Demonstrated 
      
Ongoing50 0.045*** 0.112*** 0.048*** 0.039** -0.031** 
 (0.016) (0.020) (0.015) (0.019) (0.014) 
Future50 0.001 0.023 0.029 0.028 0.015 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.015) 
Difference in difference 0.0432 0.0891 0.0190 0.0106 -0.0463 
F test: ongoing-future=0 6.377 17.63 1.015 0.234 8.135 
p value 0.0116 2.75e-05 0.314 0.629 0.00437 
Observations 30,517 30,517 30,362 30,279 29,913 
R-squared 0.092 0.114 0.162 0.129 0.069 
Robust standard errors (clustered by the survey clusters) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All estimations include baseline 
controls, region- and year fixed effects. 
 
Table 8: Bilateral aid projects to Nigeria, Uganda, Malawi and Senegal 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Union member Member of other 
organisation 
Attend community 
meetings 
Raised issue Demonstrated 
Ongoing50 -0.019 -0.023 -0.004 -0.022 -0.006 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.028) (0.023) 
Future50 -0.053* -0.077** -0.014 -0.011 -0.014 
 (0.031) (0.033) (0.030) (0.031) (0.023) 
Diff-indiff ongoing-future 0.0339 0.0537 0.0108 -0.0109 0.00797 
F test: ongoing-future=0 2.675 4.045 0.491 0.254 0.616 
p value of F test 0.102 0.0446 0.484 0.614 0.433 
Observations 9,762 9,762 9,717 9,687 9,602 
R-squared 0.087 0.078 0.183 0.145 0.051 
Robust standard errors (clustered by the survey clusters) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All estimations include baseline 
controls, region- and year fixed effects. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Variable descriptions    
 
Dependent variables, union involvement 
Union member: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent reports to be a member of a trade union or farmers association; zero if not 
a member. 
Union ordinal: ranging between 0 and 3, capturing the response categories 0=Not a Member, 1=Future Member, 2=Ongoing Member, 
3=Official Leader, respectively, given in response to the question of whether the respondent is a member of ‘A trade union or 
farmers association’. 
 
Proximity to Chinese project sites 
Ongoing50: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent lives within 50 km of a site where a Chinese aid project is being implemented 
at the time of the interview, zero otherwise.  
Ongoing25: Same as Ongoing50 but using a 25 km cut-off. 
Ongoing75: Same as Ongoing50 but using a 75 km cut-off. 
Future50: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent lives within 50 km of a Chinese projects site where the implementation of the 
project had not yet started at the time of the interview and do not have any ongoing or completed project within this same 
distance, zero otherwise. 
Future25: Same as Future50 but using a 25 km cut-off. 
Future75: Same as Future50 but using a 75 km cut-off. 
Completed50: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent lives within 50 km of a completed Chinese project and do not have any 
active project within this same distance, zero otherwise. 
Completed25: Same as Completed50 but using a 25 km cut-off. 
Completed75: Same as Completed 50 but using a 75 km cut-off. 
 
Individual control variables 
Female: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent is female; zero otherwise. 
Urban: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent lives in an urban area; zero otherwise. 
Age variables: Age in years and age squared. 
 
Year dummies: Dummies for interview year, 2002-2006 
Country dummies: Dummies for the 18 countries in the sample 
Sub-national region dummies: Dummies for the 264 sub-national regions (first-order administrative division, indicated region or province in 
the Afrobarometer) in the sample   
 
Table A2: Summary statistics 
 Variable N Mean SD 
Outcome variables 
  Member union (dummy) 29,954 0,192 0,394 
Union activity (ordinal) 29,954 0,334 0,738 
Aid variables 
  Distance to closest project (km) 29,954 141,518 134,761 
ongoing50 29,954 0,125 0,331 
future50 29,954 0,241 0,428 
ongoing25 29,954 0,090 0,286 
future25 29,954 0,154 0,361 
ongoing75 29,954 0,136 0,342 
future75 29,954 0,295 0,456 
Control variables 
  age 29,954 36,459 14,758 
age2 (divided by 100) 29,954 15,470 13,225 
female 29,954 0,498 0,500 
urban 29,954 0,443 0,497 
 Summary statistics for the baseline estimation sample from the regression with sub-national region dummies in Table 1 (Column 2) 
 
  
3 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3: World Bank transport projects and union involvement 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Member union Member union 
   
ongoing50 -0.004 -0.006 
 (0.022) (0.021) 
future50 -0.028 -0.029 
 (0.024) (0.024) 
   
Observations 9,744 7,735 
R-squared 0.101 0.095 
Baseline controls YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Region FE YES YES 
Difference in difference 0.0238 0.0235 
F test: ongoing50-future50=0 1.238 1.202 
p value 0.266 0.273 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
